

# **Annex 16**

## **Civilian-Military Cooperation**

## Annex 16

### Civilian-Military Cooperation

#### This Annex is composed of 4 sections:

**Section 1** answers the question “What is Civilian-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)?” through excerpts from an article by Major A. Demers in the DND publication: The Bulletin (“for soldiers, by soldiers”) in 2005.

**Section 2** brings excerpts from another article on CIMIC (published in the same edition of The Bulletin), this time entitled “The Evolving Role of Civil –Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Operations in International Settings” by Lieutenant Aldon Skidd.<sup>1</sup>

**Section 3** reproduces an article by Stacey Douglas because of its historical overview of events leading “Toward a Comprehensive Canadian CIMIC Doctrine: Interagency Cooperation and the Influence of Allies in the Balkans”.<sup>2</sup>

**Section 4** makes reference to the results of a Military/Pacifist Similarities Survey to be found on a web site run by William R. Taylor<sup>3</sup>, medical doctor and author of Lethal American Confusion: How Bush and the Pacifists Each Failed in the War on Terrorism. Survey results and questions can be found on the site.

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#### **Section 1 – What is Civilian-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)?**

Section 1 answers the question “What is Civilian-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)?” through excerpts from an article by Major A. Demers in the DND publication: The Bulletin (“for soldiers, by soldiers”) in 2005.

##### **“Introduction**

If you ask the question "what is civilian-military cooperation (CIMIC)?" to most soldiers, you will probably get "CIMIC does projects" or "CIMIC provides humanitarian aid to the locals" as an answer. ("Soldiers" is a generic term that includes officers, senior NCOs and junior ranks.) Yet those answers only scratch the surface of CIMIC operations (see figure 1). The primary intent of CIMIC operations, according to Canadian (CA) doctrine, is to support civilian authority, population, international organizations (IOs) and/or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in order to assist in the pursuit of a military objective.

“When we turn to AJP-9 NATO CIMIC Doctrine, the immediate purpose of CIMIC is to establish and maintain the full co-operation of the NATO commander and the civilian authorities, organisations, agencies and population within a commander's area of operations (AOO) in order to allow him to fulfill his mission. This may include direct support to the implementation of a civil plan. The long-term purpose of CIMIC is to help create and sustain conditions that will support the achievement of alliance objectives in operations. Finally, looking at the core CIMIC

functions at the tactical level, we can see that projects are a sub function of the support to civil environment line of activity:

- **Civil Military Liaison and Assessments.** Advise commanders on local activities as they may influence their mission and their responsibilities towards the civil populace. Also, carry out continuous assessments of the local civil environment, including local needs, in order to identify the extent of any vacuum and how that void might be filled.
- **Support the Force.** Maximize civil support for the timely entrance, conduct of operations and orderly withdrawal of alliance forces, and reduce civil interference on operational matters.
- **Support the Civil Environment.** Where necessary [emphasis added], commit resources to create conditions that facilitate the execution of operations, and where possible hasten a return to normalcy.

**[Figures I and II removed]**

“From the previous paragraph, we can readily see that projects are only one part of CIMIC work. The question that remains is why do projects take on such prominence in the eyes of both the population and our own forces? The aim of this paper is to explore CIMIC projects and see how we can execute project activities, while at the same time managing the expectations of all the different actors in a theatre of operations where the population is in need of everything.

#### **“Kabul Multinational Brigade Project Activities**

For the duration of KMNB V, the aim of CIMIC projects was to support the commander’s mission within the AOO by establishing goodwill, trust, credibility and a measure of positive reinforcement in support of the local authorities. CIMIC projects would only be undertaken to support an increase in overall force protection by gaining the support of local populations in areas which posed the greatest threat in the brigade “forward defence” concept.<sup>2</sup> Consideration was given to focus CIMIC projects in those geographic areas that would support this objective. Particular attention was given to increasing project activities north of Kabul, in the Shamali plain area, in the Eastern district and in the southwestern portion of the AOO. Other than force protection, KMNB CIMIC project supported the regional economic development (by buying supplies locally and using local workers in contract work).

“Furthermore, project activities would generally fall within one of the following categories:

- Social projects included support to education, public health and sports programs.
- Infrastructure improvements projects included water, electricity and any minor repair or reconstruction of physical structures.

“Regardless of the line of CIMIC activity, KMNB projects always tried to bolster support for the Afghan Transition Authority (ATA) at the local level. The KMNB project cycle was a simple process that started with the CIMIC team leaders identifying possible projects during the normal day to day framework operations. The tactical teams always identified the most urgent needs of the population in a given area and produced a project proposal, which was submitted to the KMNB activity cell. At that level, the project was evaluated in order to ensure that the funds were available, that the project did not go against the donor’s guidelines and, most importantly, that the project proposal was in line with the brigade priorities.<sup>3</sup> If approved, by KMNB, the project was submitted for approval by the donors. Once the funds were allocated, the CIMIC team implemented the project with or without the help of the activity cell, depending on the scope of the endeavour. (Figure 2 summarizes the KMNB project management process. [removed])

“Various sources of funding were available to KMNB V. Money was rarely a factor in the project approval process. It was essentially a question of identifying valid projects supporting the commander’s intent. ...

[table removed]

“the final part of the implementation was the handover of the project to the local government and the community during an official ceremony. As part of the information operations (Info Ops) campaign, such project activities were featured regularly in venues like ISAF News or a local newspaper like the Kabul Times. This allowed KMNB CIMIC to get the maximum effect on the population from each project. Such good news stories played a key role in shaping the perception of the Afghan population towards the reconstruction efforts and promoted the legitimacy of the ATA, supported by ISAF, through the display of visible and tangible results on the ground.

[main body of the article has been removed]

### **Conclusion:**

“In the case of KMNB V, CIMIC activities had to result in an increase of the force protection level, i.e., implementing a project to “win the hearths and minds of the population.” That was the real payoff for our troops. Implementing projects and providing HA are only one part of CIMIC operations, albeit, the most visible and attractive one. It must be managed carefully if we are not to fall prey to mission creep<sup>7</sup> and become enamoured with only the final result of a project, forgetting why we executed that project in the first place. It must be understood that CIMIC projects are a small portion of the many functions required. Assessments, liaison and contributions to Info Ops were by far the most significant and important contribution of KMNB CIMIC to the overall effectiveness of the mission. In the end, we must always remember that CIMIC is not, after all, an NGO in uniform.

## **Section 2 – The Evolving Role of Civil-Military Cooperation**

### **BACKGROUND**

“Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is an important, but frequently misunderstood, area of operations in both domestic and international missions. Many see CIMIC as the military equivalent of humanitarian organisations. This illconceived perception neglects the important military role CIMIC can and does play. It has become clear from recent missions that the need for further discussion and analysis of the current CIMIC doctrine, which is still evolving, is required to help strengthen this significant operational tool. Indeed, when CIMIC activities are well orchestrated, they become a combat multiplier, which plays an important role in the campaign to “win the hearts and minds” of the civilian population. This article seeks to examine several of the lessons learned from Operation ATHENA in Kabul, Afghanistan, from a CIMIC perspective and offers several ideas for enhancement of the current doctrinal guidelines.

In terms of doctrine, CIMIC has often been regarded as the embodiment of the government's 3-D approach to international affairs: it seems to exemplify the cohesion of defence, diplomacy and development policy under one umbrella.<sup>1</sup> Unfortunately, the vision of the CIMIC operator as a humanitarian actor building schools and distributing much-needed supplies to those in need disregards the operational value of a CIMIC organization in enhancing force protection. While these functions, no doubt, contribute to a mission and the overall government direction, it is important to frame the purpose of CIMIC through a military lens: each successive act of apparent benevolence is carefully orchestrated to bring about the maximum impact with the minimum expenditure of resources.

“Consider the case of Afghanistan, where a small group of CIMIC operators are striving to enhance force protection and guard the commander's centre of gravity—to win and maintain the support of the local population. In a country destroyed by 23 years of conflict, it was not difficult to assess the needs of the local population as a whole. The question thus became, where exactly could the limited resources allotted be best expended to achieve the maximum effect? Would it be better to construct a well in an area devoid of proper infrastructure or next to the home of an influential figure in the local community? In a country where the educational infrastructure has been destroyed, illiteracy is commonplace and many citizens are unable to recognize signs, let alone national flags. Added to this is the multiple non-government organizations (NGOs), each with their own slick logo. While many Afghans understand the symbol of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the question that begs asking is, is it safe to assume a Canadian flag attached to a well will be interpreted any different than the logo of an NGO?”

“Consequently, there is a great need for careful assessment of the terrain in any CIMIC operation to determine both the needs of the local populace and the mechanism for spreading information. CIMIC, after all, contributes significantly to the information operations campaign. This is not to say that the humanitarian motive is sidelined or sacrificed to the military objectives; on the contrary, the doctrinal guidance points towards the need for harmonization of military activities with both the desires of the local government and the activities of the rest of the international community (IC). Indeed, military and humanitarian imperatives are rarely mutually exclusive, despite the apparent aversion of certain organizations to cooperate with any military activity. It should be noted that CIMIC is not a panacea for needs of the local population, although it will likely be viewed as such. In Afghanistan, especially in the wake of the Taliban's fall from power, a plethora of international *“More often than not, the center of gravity will be an intangible, essential element of the political and moral forces that keep our enemies in the fight against us.”* 1 For a good overview of this policy in Afghanistan, see <http://www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca/menu-en.asp>.”

### **Section 3 -Toward a Comprehensive Canadian CIMIC Doctrine:**

reproduces an article by Stacey Douglas because for its historical overview of events leading “Toward a Comprehensive Canadian CIMIC Doctrine: Interagency Cooperation and the Influence of Allies in the Balkans”.<sup>4</sup> Submitted to The Canadian Military Journal Date: 12 November 2002

“Since the beginning of the multi-national intervention, nearly 40,000 Canadian soldiers have served in the Balkans. More generally, since the end of the Cold War, not only has the frequency of interventions increased, so too have their complexity and scope. Several Canadian Forces initiatives in Civil-Military Cooperation [CIMIC] have occurred as a result of the need to be interoperable in the Balkans and yet CIMIC cells remain relatively uncoordinated at the national level. In recognition of the need for a more systematic approach to intervention, many allies’ armed forces have instituted national-level civil affairs groups. The augmentation of Canadian peacekeeping forces to include larger CIMIC elements is not necessarily an option, nor will it be, necessarily, the most effective solution in the future. But regular cooperation at all levels with other government agencies, experienced in reconstruction and the provision of humanitarian aid, will allow the CF to lever its capabilities and strengthen its contribution to future multi-national interventions.

### **The Beginnings of Interagency Cooperation**

“Most military operations have elements of civil-military interaction in the field, but training and posting specific to civil affairs in the CF has been quite limited<sup>1</sup> since the return of the Canadian contingent from occupied European territory after the Second World War<sup>2</sup>. Many nations’ armed forces, including those of the US<sup>3</sup>, Britain<sup>4</sup> and France, have significant historical experience in civil affairs through occupations and colonial wars, but these experiences have had varying effects on present day force structure. The nature of the planning of Canadian contributions to UN peacekeeping missions has required close cooperation between the once named Department of External Affairs and DND, but regular civil-military cooperation at higher levels was not extended to the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) nor to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) until relatively recently.

“In the Canadian context, development and post-war reconstruction predating CIDA evolved quite separately from the military through the Colombo Plan, which involved projects of construction, the provision of commodities and a civilian exchange of expertise between Commonwealth nations.<sup>5</sup> Since CIDA’s inception in 1968, its support for conflict-ridden areas and refugees has coincided on a number of occasions with the deployment of CF personnel as UN peacekeepers.<sup>6</sup> These funds, as well as other instances of emergency and humanitarian assistance were donated either bilaterally or through relief and humanitarian organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). On a few occasions, CIDA has cooperated with DND directly.<sup>7</sup> But, until the peacekeeping and humanitarian activity in the Balkans of the past decade, development aid workers’ and peacekeepers’ mandates were growing along parallel lines of a security/development continuum and organisations other than DND were gaining experience in aiding displaced persons and returnees.

“In 1968, CIDA created an NGO Division with a \$5 million budget to be distributed on a matching-grant basis.<sup>8</sup> Commensurate with rising number of NGOs, CIDA now spends approximately \$186 million (or approximately 11.9 per cent of its budget)<sup>9</sup> on the voluntary sector, not including the funds channelled through organisations such as the ICRC for humanitarian assistance. As well, more money is now spent on peacebuilding and sustainable development projects<sup>10</sup> such as those directed by Canadian soldiers in the Balkans, thus “Canadian aid contributes to global security by tackling threats to human security, such as human rights violations, disease, population growth, environmental degradation, and the growing gap between rich and poor.”<sup>11</sup> Moreover, although the humanitarian imperative of NGOs supported by CIDA requires they maintain their independence, focussing national peacebuilding funds on specific regions allows for the earliest withdrawal of the costly military presence.

### **Developing Precedents in Interagency Cooperation: CIMIC in Bosnia-Herzegovina**

“On 20 December 1995, following the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was replaced with the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) in support of resolution 1031 adopted by the United Nations (UN). Within its mandated year, this multinational force, comprising some 60,000 troops, took part in various projects of reconstruction. Although IFOR focused on Annex 1 of the GFAP, “IFOR commanders and forces looked almost from the first day to conduct various projects to benefit the local population.”<sup>12</sup> National contingents administered the funds for reconstruction in their areas of responsibility that were donated by their respective governments or national development agencies; agencies of other nations contributing to their sectors; and regional organizations; although some money was made available directly through the North Atlantic Council.<sup>13</sup> In the development of the CIMIC strategies of all actors involved, operations in the Balkans have proven grounds ripe for lessons-learned. As IFOR Commander Admiral Leighton Smith explained in April of 1996: “In November (1995), we had never heard of CIMIC, we had no idea

what you did... now we can't live without you."<sup>14</sup> For Canadians, working alongside allies more experienced in CIMIC, these operations were particularly experimental in civil-military and interagency cooperation.

“When Canadians were first posted to the Balkans on CANBAT 1 and 2, and subsequently on IFOR, Public Affairs officers and Liaison officers, numbering two to three per brigade, fulfilled various tasks including reporting to NDHQ and liaising with humanitarian International Organisations (IOs). Because of the US experience in Civil Affairs during the Cold War, a large proportion of the CIMIC element in IFOR and the subsequent Stabilization Force (SFOR) was initially American:

“Many SFOR troop-contributing nations have deployed CIMIC personnel, but the United States — through its regular and reserve Civil Affairs units — has provided the majority of CIMIC capability available to IFOR and SFOR commanders. Over the past two years this commitment has amounted to some 1400 civil affairs officers and non-commissioned officers. The majority of these soldiers are reservists and are mobilised for 270 days then placed under the operational control of the IFOR/SFOR for six months. Until December 1997, approximately 320 United States Army Civil Affairs personnel were under SFOR control at any given time.<sup>15</sup>

“Although the first Canadian CIMIC cell was not formed until 1997 at 1 Canadian Division Headquarters,<sup>16</sup> Canadian troops successfully implemented over \$1.8 million worth of assistance on CIDA’s behalf between the years 1996 and 2000<sup>17</sup> including a ‘roofs and windows’ project in Bihac during IFOR (\$300 000). Cooperation in KFOR was slightly more ad hoc,<sup>18</sup> but CIDA and DND worked together in the rehabilitation of Rinas airport in Albania and continue to work together on reconstruction projects.

“While Multi-National Division South West (MND SW) was under British command, the British Department for International Development (DFID) offered funding to all military contingents for two projects: the first, The Western Bosnia Rehabilitation Program (WBRP), through which humanitarian aid was delivered, and, secondly, the Return and Reconciliation Project, designed to encourage the return of displaced persons into integrated communities.<sup>19</sup> An evaluation of the WBRP undertaken by the Centre for Defence Studies at King’s College, London found that, although well suited to the initial stages of intervention in an emergency, military ownership of development assistance and civil-military relations in general were ‘conceptually flawed for a peace-support mission’s long-term goal: civilian rule.’<sup>20</sup>

“At the request of the Canadian commander of MND SW in 2001, CIDA offered \$2 million for the Community Improvement Project (CIP), half of which was to be allocated to four Canadian rotations and the other half to all other national contingents. Apart from the exclusion of business development, the interagency CIP is a virtual “photocopy” of the tried and tested British initiative. In July 2001, the first instalment of \$250 000 was made available to Rotation VIII—an excellent opportunity for Canadian soldiers but small relative to other contingents in the division.

“The Dutch Ministry of Development supplied approximately \$2.79 million in annual funding to the Dutch Battle Group.<sup>21</sup> As well, Dutch reservists were deployed for short terms in an innovative manner through a “programme to assist in small business development. They teach locals how to develop business plans, how to apply for business loans and how to market their goods.”<sup>22</sup> Although Canadian reservists were not deployed in such a manner, “more regular and reserve officers have since been trained in CIMIC through the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre and at Fort Bragg, and theatre-specific training was developed on Rotation IX.<sup>23</sup> The question left to

be answered by those currently developing a new CIMIC strategy is whether Canadian soldiers should become ‘more interoperable’ and in doing so take on more of the onus and develop a greater institutional capability for reconstruction and peacebuilding.

### **“Developing CIMIC Doctrine: Maximising Partnerships and Organising for Efficiency**

“Development projects are a single aspect of CIMIC but their direction by military personnel broaches issues at the heart of the current debate about civil-military cooperation in general. Certainly, the concept of military personnel performing development work or functions of civil administration is an “over-militarisation” inasmuch as soldiers present competition for limited funding. What remains for debate, and could be determined on a mission-specific basis, is the relative importance of winning the confidence of local civilians to promoting the earliest withdrawal of a military presence. In the absence or unavailability of civilian actors or organisations there is little question that able military personnel should execute the needs of civil administration.

“A 1999 study by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) found that in most cases civilian organisations were better suited to providing development and humanitarian aid. If, at any place and time, it is cost-effective for militaries to be doing reconstruction work it is in the Balkans, and right now, where the scope and scale of the established peacekeeping operations are almost without compare. Accordingly, the DAC study recognises that “the military units for such repairs were already on-site and their involvement constituted an add-on cost. In these cases, the military may very well have been the cheaper and most readily available alternative.”<sup>24</sup>

Reconstruction activities in support of returnees will remain essential to peacebuilding regardless of whether they are directed by CF personnel. Once needs have been assessed, the extent to which they can be fulfilled by civilian organisations will depend on the level of interagency cooperation. Allies’ CIMIC doctrines, reflecting force structure and informed by historical experience including that of the Balkans, vary in operational and tactical level flexibility and the provision for interagency cooperation.

“Undoubtedly best prepared of the allies for the challenges of civil-military cooperation in Bosnia Herzegovina, Americans, in their Civil Affairs (CA) operations, are first guided by the distinction between “substantial troop deployments” and “complex contingency operations” through Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56).<sup>25</sup> Although the U.S. Army had an extensive military government capacity by the end of World War II, “the civil affairs function of the U.S. Army evoked bitter debate in every major war from the war with Mexico to World War I.”<sup>26</sup> After just eight years of post-World War II experience in civic action projects in Korea and elsewhere, the Presidentially appointed Draper Committee recommended military and economic aid continue to be given to nations “under the gun” of communism. Aid was ensured thereafter through the Mutual Security Act to nations such as Vietnam and several in Latin America. By the end of the Cold War, both American civil affairs theory and capabilities were well developed.

“Currently, a “unity of effort” is achieved through military cooperation with a variety of participating national agencies and departments.<sup>27</sup> Since August 2000, USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), and the Department of Defense’s Office of Democracy and Governance have had a memorandum of understanding delineating their respective capabilities in the conduct of “civilian-military relations and other democracy building programs, and defining areas of future collaboration.”<sup>28</sup> American CA personnel are largely reservists and involved in

many facets of peacebuilding. Indeed, “[i]n Haiti, [American] civil affairs soldiers performed activities that ranged from restoring electricity throughout the countryside, to serving as expert advisors to 12 government ministries.”<sup>29</sup> Similarly, new British doctrine will make use of CA personnel to fill the administrative vacuum resulting from complex emergencies.

“The new British Civil Affairs Group is composed of approximately 10 regular officers and another 100 members of the Territorial Army. At the start of a future operation, officers from the core group will deploy for three to six months “to assess the impact of civilian activity on military plans”, originally filling the vacuum of humanitarian and government functions with reservists until such functions can be performed by civilian organisations.<sup>30</sup> CIMIC doctrine, in the final stages of development, emphasizes “extensive liaison with the civic leaders within the jurisdiction. Likewise, the individual soldiers within each patrol are expected to conduct themselves in a manner that gains them credibility and respect with the local population,”<sup>31</sup> as per the historical experience of aiding the civil powers in Northern Ireland. British doctrine concerns itself with interagency cooperation insofar as its dedicated specialists will liaise regularly with other government agencies and IOs but French doctrine is distinguished by its division of levels of cooperation.

“French civil affairs doctrine, rewritten in 1997, entrenches the importance of civil-sector considerations at various stages of intervention. Interagency cooperation is to take place at four separate levels, encompassing Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), Military-Civil Affairs (MCA), and Civil-Military Relations (MCR)<sup>32</sup>: political, strategic, operational and tactical.<sup>33</sup> At the strategic level, cooperation is further divided into three areas of consideration: inter-ministerial relations, the concept of control, and the impact of military action on the civil environment.<sup>34</sup> The origin of French civil-military action is related to two impetuses: new operational factors and the American experience.<sup>35</sup> Until 1955, French soldiers continued to be trained for military government functions but the new doctrine, based on the American practice, was first written in 1996, then again in 2002. As well, a new inter-army group for civil-military actions comprising 96 regular force soldiers 434 reserve personnel will be fully operational by 2003. A typical French CIMIC expert cell in Kosovo includes officers with the following expertise: economics/finance, energy, education, transport logistics, telecommunication, water/environment, infrastructure, petroleum products, public administration, air traffic, industry/mines, agriculture. In total, 17 officers per cell will provide many of the necessary functions for the initial reconstruction of conflict-ridden area.

“DND policy is one of arm’s length from reconstruction. The White Paper states: “Over the long-term, however, reconstructive activities--be they the administration and enforcement of civil law, the provision of medical care, or the distribution of humanitarian aid--are best left to civilian organizations.”<sup>36</sup> DND began cooperating with these civilian organisations through CIDA’s NGO Division in 1994. An NGO working group, convened to share lessons and “codify these lessons through policy dialogue with government and other players,”<sup>37</sup> culminated in the creation of the Canadian Peacebuilding Contact Committee (CPCC), comprising NGOs and academics, as well as CIDA, DND and DFAIT representatives. In 1996 the CF was involved with an exercise simulating a complex emergency in Gagetown,<sup>38</sup> proposed by CIDA and a number of the NGOs.<sup>39</sup> Although no further exercises of this type have since taken place, NGOs regularly brief CF peacekeepers<sup>40</sup> and an exchange programme has been set up between the CF and CARE Canada.<sup>41</sup> This flurry of activity and the participation of Canadian troops in Balkans prompted the writing of a Canadian CIMIC handbook.

“During the 1996-1997 writing of *Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War*, the author consulted widely with CIDA, DFAIT and NGOs. The handbook is essential as a political statement in describing relatively organically the importance of the ‘New Partnership,’ but arguing: “[t]he CF has no formalized CIMIC structure at the strategic, operational or tactical levels. This situation must be remedied by the CF to become more effective and efficient, particularly when employed in complex emergencies.”<sup>42</sup> Apart from the fact that more CIMIC officers have since received training, in the five years of its existence, little has been done to ensure the essence of this policy statement be translated into doctrine. In fact, since this document has not yet been translated into French it is not an official publication and acts as a reference for those already experienced in CIMIC.

“Since 2001, many more reservists have been trained in CIMIC at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre.<sup>43</sup> Because reservists presumably have a stronger affinity with the civilian work force, their deployment in a Canadian CIMIC capacity has been advocated in the past but efforts to guarantee their civilian employment upon return have yet failed. It would be curious to require that Canadian political and other advisors be under military command and have undergone military training to interface with another civilian government, especially since this task has been performed by CIDA in the past.<sup>45</sup> Judging by the number of NGOs currently working as civilian specialists and supported by CIDA in the Balkans, the concept of replacing civilian expertise with military specialists might also be a misuse of resources. Currently, a list of civilian specialists ready for deployment is held by CANADEM, an NGO that screens candidates for eventual selection by IOs. A recent German initiative has gone farther, preparing civilian specialists with the standardised training deemed necessary to deploy in complex emergencies. If a combination of Canadian civil and military peace builders is to be present in future complex emergencies, a dedicated national-level CIMIC cell and further interagency cooperation at the strategic level would ensure not only adequate funding for the areas of CF responsibility in the future but provisions for a more systematic approach to intervention.

When making a case for NATO’s need for strategic civil-military cooperation, Dick Zandee, former member of the Bosnia Task Force of NATO’s International Staff, argues:

Lack of relevant and accurate information on the potential roles and tasks of other organizations involved in peace operations, on their capabilities, procedures and working methods will lead to incorrect assessments and inadequate decision-making. It will have a detrimental effect on mission planning and execution.<sup>46</sup>

“On a similar inclination, Strategy 2020 affirms the need to “maximize [DND’s] *strategic partnerships* through the most effective collaboration with Other Government Departments.”<sup>47</sup> Among the past initiatives of such strategic partnerships is the creation of the successful Disaster Assistance Response Team. Yet, the experiment with an Interdepartmental Task Force for planning the mission to Zaire, with representatives from the Privy Council Office, DFAIT, CIDA, and DND, has not been replicated since.

“Peacekeeping is but one stage in the long process of reaching and maintaining forward security and, ultimately, CIMIC is inherently limited to supporting the force commander’s objectives. Well-trained and suitable Canadian CIMIC operators are essential to interacting with civilians in the field and to promoting a unity of effort. Regardless of the nature of future interventions, and as suggested by the French example, interagency coordination would encourage planners to account for civil-sector considerations at the political, strategic and operational levels. A standing committee similar to the interagency contact group for the mission to Zaire would allow

for lessons learned on the intervention in general, or for the entire lifecycle of the conflict. Furthermore, greater cooperation would ease the decisions of when to safely replace soldiers with their less costly civilian counterparts and whether or not it would be beneficial to focus on a particular Canadian comparative advantage.

Notes are all given in footnote below.<sup>5</sup>

## **Section 4 - Military/Pacifist Similarities Survey**

Information on this topic can be found at a web site run by William R. Taylor<sup>6</sup>, medical doctor and author of Lethal American Confusion: How Bush and the Pacifists Each Failed in the War on Terrorism.

Survey results and questions can be found on the site. Survey results are not included in this document, in spite of their attempt to make a contribution to seeking common ground between two key constituencies in any discussion of conflict management. The questions themselves are also thought provoking. However, it was felt that the sample was too small to be of significant value and the results are, at times, confusing. However, readers with a particular interest in this subject can find a beginning to further research at this site. Some brief background information is provided below.

### **Results Of The Military/Pacifist Similarities Survey**<sup>7</sup>

#### **Background Information**

“We started as a group of about 10 people who are members or attendees of a Quaker Meeting (church) in Connecticut. (This project is not an official activity of that Meeting.) We collected a group of 46 items of possible similarity between advocates of war and those favoring peace. Most of the planning group are pacifists; however, one served 2 years as a Navy psychiatrist in Philadelphia during the Vietnam War. Another has had considerable professional contact with personnel from the Judge Advocate General Corps. We also have relatives who have served in the Armed Forces, and one of us considered the war against Afghanistan to be justified by the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.

“We are interested in finding common ground between two main groups; each group holds a range of opinions.

“Here is a description of each group:

1. "Pacifists," "peace organizations," or "pacifist groups," includes
  - Peace activists, who work for peace in the ways of their choice (demonstrating, writing letters to Congress and the president, talking to others, sometimes carrying out acts of civil disobedience.) These individuals would generally oppose U.S. military action against any nation or organization that the U.S. government has identified as a danger, or potential danger, to the security of the U.S. (Some definitions would include in this group only those opposing all wars at all times.)
  - Members of "peace churches" such as Anabaptists (Mennonites, Amish, Brethren), Quakers, or organizations such as Pax Christi ([see note 1](#)). These groups generally oppose war, though some members of one group or another might support a particular war.

- Others who generally oppose U.S. military action against any nation or organization that the U.S. government has identified as a danger, or potential danger, to the security of the U.S. (Some in this group might not discuss their views, and might not often take part in demonstrations. If they join a demonstration, they usually do so as individuals, not as a member of a group.)
2. "The military" includes:
- members and former members of the U.S. military,
  - their families,
  - others in any walk of life who generally support U.S. military action against any nation or organization the government has identified as a danger, or potential danger, to the security of the U.S.”

### **Endnotes – Annex 16:**

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<sup>1</sup> Skidd, Lieutenant Alden “The Evolving Role of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Operations in International Settings”, The Bulletin, for soldiers by soldiers, Vol 11 No 1, [http://armyapp.dnd.ca/ALLC/Downloads/bulletin/Vol\\_11/Bulletin\\_Vol10No1Eng.pdf](http://armyapp.dnd.ca/ALLC/Downloads/bulletin/Vol_11/Bulletin_Vol10No1Eng.pdf), (February 2005 17)

<sup>2</sup> Douglas, Stacey: “Toward a Comprehensive Canadian CIMIC Doctrine: Interagency Cooperation and the Influence of Allies in the Balkans”, The Canadian Military Journal, <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/symposia/2002/douglas.htm>, (12 November 2002 )

<sup>3</sup> Taylor, William R. , M.D. Lethal American Confusion: How Bush and the Pacifists Each Failed in the War on Terrorism. “I spent 40 years practicing child and family psychiatry in clinics, hospitals, schools, and private practice. My wife and I have been married for 47 years, and have three kids and six grandchildren. During the Vietnam War, I served for two years in the U.S. on active duty as a psychiatrist in the Navy. I joined a Quaker Meeting (one of the pacifist churches) in the 1970s. After retiring from psychiatry in 2000, I published a book: American Confusion from Vietnam to Kosovo (available at Amazon.com.) That book also used the cognitive map forecasting method you will learn in Lethal American Confusion. I supported the war on Afghanistan, assuming that the criteria for a just war had been met. We now know that those criteria were not met, because the administration's own documents reveal that they had decided to invade before meeting all the requirements for a just war. I did not support the war on Iraq.” [www.AmericanConfusion.com](http://www.AmericanConfusion.com). (August 2007)

<sup>4</sup> Douglas, Stacey: “Toward a Comprehensive Canadian CIMIC Doctrine: Interagency Cooperation and the Influence of Allies in the Balkans”, The Canadian Military Journal, <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/symposia/2002/douglas.htm>, (12 November 2002 )

<sup>5</sup> 1. Although I have not done an exhaustive study of operations during the Cold War, a few examples are indicative of the *nature* of Canadian civil affairs. Depending on the size of the Canadian contingent and their place in UN command structure, relations with civilians varied: ONUC HQ included a public relations section, although it is not clear that Canadian officers took part since very few were posted to the HQ, (see *Report No. 8, Directorate of History, CFHQ, Canada and Peace-keeping Operations, The Congo, 1960-64*) and Canadians shared a headquarters with civilian UN personnel in UNEF 1, employed many local civilians, and one Canadian was posted as a Public Relations Officer (*Report No. 78, Historical Section (G.S.), Army HQ, 2 Jan 59, Some Impressions of UNEF, 1957-1958.*) An A5 was posted to Germany for much of the Cold War. These officers, whose job it was to smooth over relations with local authorities during Canadian exercises, were trained in an American school in Germany, see Sean Maloney, *War Without Battles: Canada's NATO Brigade in Germany, 1951-1993*, pp. 419-420, and subsequent interview with the author, 12 Sep 02.

2. For the occupation in Europe, Canadian Civil Affairs Officers were trained at Wimbledon, UK, Charlottesville, US and at the Royal Military College in Kingston and by the end of February 1945, there were 340 Canadian officers employed in Civil Affairs on various missions abroad. See *Report No. 9, Historical Section (G.S.), Army Headquarters, 08 Oct 46.*

3. For a short history of American civil affairs before the Second World War, see the Training Packet No. 8, Civil Affairs Studies: Illustrative from Cases 1 Military Occupations, <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/cgi->

[bin/usamhi/DL/showdoc.pl?docnum=169](#). Training related to civil affairs was not considered essential until the Second World War, when it appeared that civilian agencies were not willing or prepared to take on the task of governing occupied territory, see *U.S. Army in World War II, Special Studies, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors*, by Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Wrinberg.

4. More recent experience in the United Kingdom relates to deployments in Northern Ireland. See Major David Last, "The Importance of Peripheral Conflicts to Military Thinking: The Case of French Colonialism," US Army Command and General Staff College, 21 January 1995 for an example of how experience affected force structure.

5. Aid and Cold War containment policies were, at the very least, complementary, as wealthier Commonwealth nations supported less developed ones on the periphery of Soviet influence. Although the original members of the Colombo Plan were Australia, Canada, Ceylon, India, New Zealand, Pakistan, Malaya, British Borneo and the United Kingdom, membership was extended to the United States, Cambodia, Laos, Nepal, Thailand, the Philippines, Japan and Vietnam by 1960. In the first ten years of the Colombo Plan, 48 per cent of Canada's contribution was expended in construction projects, 45 per cent in the provision of commodities and 3.4 per cent in technical assistance. See Annual Reports of the Colombo Plan, specifically, *The Colombo Plan, Tenth Annual Report, Kuala Lumpur 1961*, p. 214, for this data.

6. To name a couple of instances: in 1978 CIDA granted \$1 200 000 to the Lebanese for 'civil conflict' at the beginning of UNIFIL and in 1990-91 CIDA spent \$4 560 000 on the 'Gulf Crisis,' see CIDA's Annual Reports.

7. For a current spent total of \$6 153 266, projects have included, (provided by CIDA's vendor database, dollar numbers in brackets are CIDA's contribution): Reconnaissance Mission – K.S. Carter (\$12 000) Yugoslavia; English Language Training for the Polish Armed Forces (\$77 379), Rwandan Airlifts (\$800 000), Mozambique Airlift of Relief Items (\$340 000), El Salvador Airlifts (\$185 001), Kinsmen African Medical Relief Ethiopia (\$149 068); Angola- Sawatsky Trips (\$22 360); Mozambique, Flood Monitoring, Radarsat (\$15 028); Civilian Peacebuilding Advisor in Eritrea and Ethiopia (\$1 820). The rest of the funds spent in the Balkans: Rehabilitation of Rinas Airport, Albania, (\$1 715 462); Community Improvement Program, Bosnia and Herzegovina (\$1 799 929); IFOR BIHAC Reconstruction (\$300 000); and KFOR Reconstruction (\$670 235), Data Entry Clerks, Kosovo (\$64 984). These figures do not include instances of DND supporting CIDA as part of Canada's foreign policy in general. Sean Maloney shows the Navy has supported CIDA in "Maple Leaf Over the Caribbean: Gunboat Diplomacy Canadian Style?" in *Canadian Gunboat Diplomacy: The Canadian Navy and Foreign Policy*.

8. CIDA, *Canada and Development Cooperation: Annual Review, 1975-76 CIDA*, p. 77.

9. CIDA, *Canada and Development Cooperation*, [http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida\\_ind.nsf/8949395286e4d3a58525641300568be1/83c8bc6f2bc7c006852568ec00634ac2?OpenDocument](http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf/8949395286e4d3a58525641300568be1/83c8bc6f2bc7c006852568ec00634ac2?OpenDocument).

10. Over the years, CIDA's expenditures have changed in another significant way: while in 1975-76 24.6 per cent of its budget was dedicated to Food Aid, that figure stands at only approximately 13.1 per cent today, see Annual Reports and *ibid*.

11. CIDA, *Canada and Development Cooperation*, [http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida\\_ind.nsf/8949395286e4d3a58525641300568be1/83c8bc6f2bc7c006852568ec00634ac2?OpenDocument#6](http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf/8949395286e4d3a58525641300568be1/83c8bc6f2bc7c006852568ec00634ac2?OpenDocument#6).

12. Adam B. Siegel, "Associating Development Projects with Military Operations: Lessons from NATO's First Year in BiH," in *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 8, No. 3, p. 99.

13. See *Ibid*.

14. See Colonel William R. Phillips, Chief, Civil-Military Cooperation SHAPE, "Civil-Military Cooperation: Vital to peace implementation in Bosnia," in *NATO Review*, WEBEDITION, Vol. 46 - No. 1, Spring 1998, pp. 22-25.

15. *Ibid*.

16. Lt. Sean Pollick, "Civil-Military Cooperation: A New Tool For Peacekeepers", *The Canadian Military Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 61.

17. Jason Hollmann, current CIDA representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina, in telephone interview by the author, 30 August 2002.

18. The Army Lessons Learned Centre, p.10. In KFOR, the level of cooperation was often based on personality as has shown Major Doug Delaney in "CIMIC Operations During Operation "Kinetic," in the *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 29-34.

19. AIA, letter from Stephen Wallace to Col. W. Natynczyk, 5 Mar 01, “Administrative Arrangement with the Department of National Defence for the Community Improvement Program (CIP) through the Canadian Contingent (TFBH) to the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Multi-National Division South West (MND SW), Bosnia & Herzegovina.”
20. Ibid.
21. Sgt. Peter Fitzgerald, in *SFOR Informer#125*, October 31, 2001.
22. Centre for Defence Studies, King’s College London, “Evaluation of the Western Bosnia Rehabilitation Programme 1996-1998,” Nov 25, 1999, p.19.
23. A course was developed by Major Colin Robinson on Rotation IX, telephone interview with the Major by the author, August 2002.
24. Development Assistance Committee, *Report No. 1, Civilian and Military Means of Providing and Supporting Humanitarian Assistance During Conflict*, p. 20.
25. Kurt E. Müller, “Toward a Concept of Strategic Civil Affairs,” in *Parameters*, Winter 1998, pp. 80-98.
26. Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, *U.S. Army in World War II, Special Studies, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors*, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, p. 4
27. Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Feb. 1, 1995).
28. <http://www.usaid.gov/democracy/cmr/usaidprogs.html>
29. H. Allen Holmes, “Civil Affairs: Reflections of the Future,” *Issues of Democracy: An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State*, Vol. 2, No. 3, July 1997.
30. Major Peter Cottrell of the British Civil Affairs Group, telephone interview conducted by the author, 9 September 2002. As well, at the national level, “[t]he Netherlands has become more and more active in CIMIC and is, for instance, in the process of forming – together with our German allies - a CIMIC Group North (consisting of a permanent core of some 40-60 personnel),” see “The Dutch Experience of Civil-Military Relations, 09-05-2001”, Speech by the Minister of Defence of the Netherlands, Mr. Frank de Grave, on the occasion of the conference “Taking stock of civil-military relations” (organised by the CESS, the CSDS and the GCDCAF), The Hague, 9 May 2001.
31. James J. Landon and Richard E. Hayes, “National Approaches to Civil-Military Coordination in Peace and Humanitarian Assistance Operations,” for The Command and Control Research Program (CCRP) within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, <http://www.dodccrp.org/>.
32. Instruction 2900, “Concept interarmées de l’action civilo-militaire,” Directive approuvée par décision 00227/DEF/EMA/EMP. 1 du 18 mars 2002.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Le Groupement Interarmées Actions Civilo-Militaires, “le GIACM: une unite au service des autres,” p. 3.
36. Chapter 6: Contributing to International Security, [http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/pol\\_docs/94wp/six.html](http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/pol_docs/94wp/six.html)
37. See the CPCC’s website, <http://www.cpcc.ottawa.on.ca/about.htm>.
38. See *1996 Report of the Auditor General of Canada*, Chapter 7 Peacekeeping, National Defence.
39. Jennifer N. Ross, “Civil-military co-operation in humanitarian interventions,” Prepared for the Second Annual Graduate Student Seminar, April 30-May 5, 2000, Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, [http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/cfp-pec/OtherAnnualEvents/Jennifer\\_Ross-en.asp](http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/cfp-pec/OtherAnnualEvents/Jennifer_Ross-en.asp).
40. Ibid.
41. Telephone interview by the author with Maj Luc-André Racine, 6 September 2002.
42. *Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War*, 103-4 of the handbook..
43. Telephone interview by the author with Maj Luc-André Racine, 6 September 2002.
45. Canadian advisers on assignment abroad have worked in such areas as: economic planning, public administration, and industry. See CIDA’s Annual Reports for numbers and functions of advisers abroad.
46. Dick Zandee, *Building Blocks for Peace: Civil-Military Interaction in Restoring Fractured Societies*, p. 74.
47. Chief of Defence Staff, *Strategy 2020*, emphasis on original, [http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/cds/strategy2k/s2k05\\_e.asp](http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/cds/strategy2k/s2k05_e.asp).

<sup>6</sup> Taylor, William R. , M.D. Lethal American Confusion: How Bush and the Pacifists Each Failed in the War on Terrorism. “I spent 40 years practicing child and family psychiatry in clinics, hospitals, schools, and private practice. My wife and I have been married for 47 years, and have three kids and six grandchildren. During the Vietnam War, I served for two years in the U.S. on active duty as a psychiatrist in the Navy. I joined a Quaker Meeting (one of the pacifist churches) in the 1970s. After retiring from psychiatry in 2000, I published a book: American Confusion from Vietnam to Kosovo (available at Amazon.com.) That book also used the cognitive map forecasting method you will learn in Lethal American Confusion. I supported the war on Afghanistan, assuming that the criteria for a just war had been met. We now know that those criteria were not met, because the administration's own documents reveal that they had decided to invade before meeting all the requirements for a just war. I did not support the war on Iraq.” [www.AmericanConfusion.com](http://www.AmericanConfusion.com). (August 2007)

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