

Annex 5

Country / State Neutrality

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Any discussion of alternatives to war begs at least a cursory look at the concept of country neutrality. Brian William Lake's analysis of "Irish Neutrality and the Common Foreign and Security Policy"¹ has been chosen for this purpose, because it shows so well how small, neutral countries can have an impact, yet retain integrity. It also demonstrates the complexity of neutrality, with a particular – but not exclusive – focus on Ireland and the European Union.

Defining Neutrality

"The basic definition of neutrality is that of not being involved between wars with other states.¹³ The legal base for this definition is established in the Fifth and Thirteenth Hague Conventions of 1907. ...The main feature of the convention is that the territory of neutral powers is inviolable. Further, belligerents are forbidden to establish any facilities on the territory of a neutral power for the purpose of non-public communication, nor are they permitted to recruit combatants in the neutral state.¹⁴ The neutral is bound to prevent these acts from being undertaken on its own territory, but is not bound to prevent any business of the belligerents as long as such business takes place outside of the territory of the neutral. A neutral power is authorized to prevent by force any attempts to violate its neutrality. This resistance cannot be interpreted as a hostile act.¹⁵

"Neutrality is not a doctrine that can be clearly undertaken through the adoption of legislation. Nor can such a status just be declared at a convenient point. Neutrality has come to represent the peacetime policy of a small number of states, and has developed conventions. These have been adopted in the realization that a clear policy stance must be maintained in order to adopt a neutral position accepted by other states in time of war. It is difficult to quantify as a political value and dubious as a political platform, as the guidelines are uncertain in their definition of what it is to be neutral.¹⁶ The generally accepted conventions on maintaining a neutral status are that the neutral state must not start any war nor join a military alliance. It must provide for an adequate internal defence. And it must arrange its foreign policy in such a way as to minimize the possibility of becoming entangled in any war.¹⁷ These guidelines have no legal foundation. The only legal definition of neutrality exists in the Hague conventions and as such the maintenance of a neutral stance in peacetime depends on the successful appearance of neutrality.

(13) Keatinge, Patrick, A Singular Stance: Irish Neutrality in the 1980s. (Dublin, Institute of Public Administration, 1984). p. 5.; (14) "Non-public communication" as mentioned in the Hague conventions implies that the communication is of a military nature. That it does not refer to military communication directly may indicate a desire to remain vague in what constitutes "non-public communication. (15)Keatinge, A Singular Stance. pp. 146-14, (16) Ibid." (17 Keatinge, A Singular Stance. p. 7)²

Defining Neutralisation: Neutralisation imposes strict obligations on the actions of a state. It is not merely state policy that is changeable at will, but a binding obligation. Switzerland was the first such model, neutralised in 1815, and the most recent European model of this type is Austria, which used the Swiss model as a basis for its own neutralisation in 1955. The legal entrenchment of neutrality in both states has created greater credibility for neutrality in each. It has done so at the expense of reducing their freedom of action in international relations. The remaining continental neutrals, Finland and Sweden, pursue neutrality as a policy approach rather than as a binding legal relationship bringing them closer in intent to the Irish model of neutrality.

Developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy in Post Cold-War Europe

“The end of the cold war and the dismantling of the Soviet bloc and Warsaw pact led to a change from a bi-polar superpower relationship with Europe in the middle. It was transformed into a multi-polar environment dominated by the United States.”³ ... “The CFSP was an attempt to address the post cold-war need for a firmer foreign policy. As the economic power of the EC grew, so did the expectation that a political voice would accompany it. This would allow the Community to address defence and security issues that directly affected it. The development of these common policies and procedures had been undertaken in the hope of developing the security and defence identity of the European Union.

“The concept of “Security” in the post cold-war era has changed. It tends to focus more on the long-term prevention of conflict. It also places a de-emphasis on the use of military force. “Defence” is also a changing concept, with less emphasis on mutual security guarantees and deterrence. Instead defence as it has been approached in the context of CFSP concentrates on the military aspects of international crisis management. The EU is not alone in adjusting to the end of the cold war. The end of the cold war has led to a decrease in defence budgets and the restructuring of national military forces. Military alliances such as NATO also found themselves without their primary mission. NATO had been created as a counterbalance to Soviet power. With the break-up of the Soviet Union, NATO needed to redefine its role in the world, and find a niche in order to stay relevant. Smaller more versatile military forces and joint efforts such as the German-French Eurocorps were the result of this more multinational approach to military engagement. The ambiguity in the development of CFSP and the difficulty in determining how to formulate a common defence are complicated by the lack of a distinct enemy.”⁴

The aim was not to replace NATO as the primary means of European defence, but would simply assume tasks that NATO did not wish to take on. As NATO Secretary General George Robertson argued, NATO remains a cornerstone of European security and our only mechanism for collective defence. The Europeans are not seeking to rival that or to duplicate that, but they are saying that the Europeans should do more in their own back yard.⁸⁵

(85) “European Force ‘no threat’ to NATO.” *CNN.com November 20, 2000. <http://europe.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/europe/11/20/eu.defence/index.html>*

Neutrality and the EU “Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)”:

“Neutral states in the EU as well as non-neutral states sought a means of cooperating closely in the post-cold war world. Issues involving regional conflict have now become important. A different response than that for which NATO was created is required. At the same time, control over foreign and defence policy is important to the member states of the EU. The development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has provided a solution that meets the needs of ... EU states. It provides a means of implementing the Petersburg tasks of humanitarian assistance, while insuring that control remains in the hands of the participant states in the CFSP. This does not please all member states. Some EU members prefer a CFSP based less on unanimity and more on a qualified majority vote. But for Ireland and the other neutrals in the EU, CFSP as it stands resolves any conflict with neutrality.

“Providing aid or peacekeeping services in accordance with UN mandates does not present a danger to neutrality. Nor does coordinating efforts through the CFSP. Revisions made in the treaty of Amsterdam have accommodated the concerns of neutral states in the EU – including Ireland. Ireland is still able to meet its foreign policy goals while retaining the control it needs to preserve neutrality. What the CFSP may become in the future is unclear. The current state of affairs is as far as many members are prepared to go. At present however, it does not bind or commit any member state to a common policy stance.”⁵

EU “Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)” and Membership in other Multilateral Organizations

“Systematic cooperation was to be established between the member states on any matter of foreign and security policy that was of common interest. To this end member states agreed to, ‘...inform and consult one another within the Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest...’⁹⁰ This extended into member-state membership in international organizations, such as NATO, The United Nations and many of the international organizations of which not all EU member-states are members. The Security Council specifically is mentioned in article J.9.2 of Maastricht. Member states on the UN Security Council are obliged to keep other member states “fully informed”. They are also required to ensure the defence of the interests of the Union within the limits of their responsibilities to the UN. France and Britain are permanent members of the Security Council, and Ireland has recently been elected to a two year term.”⁶

(90) *Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, The Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts.* (Luxembourg: Office for Official publications of the European Communities, 1999). http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/eu_cons_treaty_en.pdf Article 16.

European Political Co-operation, and how a small, neutral state can influence it: European Political Cooperation (EPC) began with the Davignon Report.⁷⁶ This report was published in 1970. It recommended quarterly meetings of the six EC foreign ministers, greater coordination between ambassadors in foreign capitals, and common EC instructions to those ambassadors.⁷⁷ EPC served as the focus for consultation and coordination of positions in international affairs. Established in 1970, the development of EPC during the first twenty years of its evolution has been described as “... a cycle of hesitant steps to strengthen the framework, followed by periods of increasing frustration at the meagre results achieved, culminating in further reluctant reinforcement of the rules and procedures.”⁷⁸ ...As a measure of the ability of Ireland to influence the development of EPC, the discussion of security matters was emphasised, as Ireland would not permit the use of the word “defence”.⁸⁴ ...EPC (has become) an intergovernmental tool without any focus on policy. Instead it concentrated more on procedure. The further development of a common foreign and security policy was not to become an issue of great concern to Ireland until 1989. The end of the cold war brought an unexpected shift in the way in which international affairs were conducted. States such as Ireland would become more relevant in the post-cold war order, as the changing concept of security led to new initiatives for maintaining stability. (74) Ardagh, John. *Ireland and the Irish: Portrait of a Changing Society.* (London: Penguin Books Ltd. 1995). p. 97. p. 205; (75) Karsh, Efraim. *Neutrality and Small States.* (London: Routledge, 1988.) p. 170. (76) McCormick, John. *The European Union: Politics and Policies* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996.) pp. 73- 82 Sharp, *Irish Foreign Policy and the European Community* pp. 210-211. (83) *Ibid.* (84) *Ibid.* p. 215.

WHAT’S UNIQUE: NEUTRALITY BY COUNTRY WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION

<p>AUSTRIA</p> <p>“Austrian neutrality is based on the Swiss model of neutrality, and shares many of the same attitudes towards how a policy of neutrality can best be implemented. An explicit declaration of the inviolability of the Austrian state is made, as well as provisions for “the maintenance and defence of permanent neutrality”, in ... the Austrian Constitution of 1955.⁵¹ Austrian neutrality is more firmly</p>	<p>http://www.parlinkom.gv.at/pd/doep/e-kl-5.htm. (53) Neuhold, <i>The European Neutrals in International Affairs.</i> p. 18. (54) <i>Ibid</i> p. 19. 55 Diez, Emanuel. <i>Neutrality: by Emanuel Diez.</i> (1986) pp. 23-24.</p> <p>“Despite this more entrenched constitutional treatment of neutrality, the manner in which this permanent neutrality is to be enforced is not specified. As a result, Austria has</p>
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<p>rooted in constitutional law as a result of the Austrian commitment to a policy of permanent neutrality in the Moscow Memorandum of 1955....In addition to a formal incorporation of neutrality into the constitution of Austria, a declaration of neutrality was also signed...”.⁷</p> <p>“For Austria, the benefit in adopting a strict policy of neutrality lay in the regaining of territorial sovereignty while placating the opposing power blocs in the cold war environment. The alternative to a policy of neutrality would likely have been a divided Austria along the Soviet and Western lines of influence.⁵³ Austria saw itself as a stabilizing factor between two power blocs, providing a buffer zone in central Europe. To this end, Austria maintained a well-armed neutrality following the Swiss example. As argued by an Austrian representative, “it is the defensive strength of the neutral which gives credibility to its assertion of maintaining neutrality under all circumstances.”⁵⁴</p> <p><i>(50) Milivojević, Marko. Swiss Neutrality and Security p. 191. (51) Constitution of Austria http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/au00000_.html#A002_</i> <i>(52) Österreichisches Parlament - Austrian Parliament. The Second Republic.</i></p>	<p>allowed itself a less rigid interpretation of neutrality policy than is the case for Switzerland. Membership in the United Nations was pursued by Austria, with the support and endorsement of Britain, The United States, the Soviet Union and France.⁵⁵ Neutrality has been seen as coinciding with the goals of the United Nations – the maintenance of peace as the basic objective of relations amongst nations. Participation in the European Community however, has been a subject of more controversy. Those in favour of joining the EC argued that cooperation in the field of foreign policy is limited to consultation and cooperation, and is limited by the requirement of unanimity. Concerns over European Political Cooperation were also present. The potential for military cooperation growing out of consultation would be a clear intrusion on Austrian neutrality. Austria has argued that EPC has no military defence role, thus diminishing any risk of violating Austrian neutrality policy.”</p> <p>It is through the use of this rationale that Austria has been able to assert a policy of neutrality while participating in the European Economic Community. As long as the prospect of military interdependence remains off-limits, Austria is able to reconcile the benefits of membership in the European Union with a liberal interpretation of neutrality policy. This more generous interpretation of neutrality policy may in fact be linked to the manner in which it was introduced. Neutrality imposed by foreign powers may not have contributed to a sense of social attachment to neutrality as a precept of foreign policy. This allows Austria more latitude than Switzerland in determining the manner by which it fulfills its commitments under the title of “permanent neutral”. This loose interpretation of neutrality is very close in practice to that of Ireland. The flexibility that is applied to neutrality policy marks a common feature between the two.</p>
<p>FINLAND</p> <p>“Finnish neutrality has strong social support. This is a result of its effective enforcement. Finland preserved its neutrality by military action. This defence against aggression provided a convincing argument for the benefits of such a policy in Finland. Finland’s 135,000 troops stood against a substantially larger Soviet force when the Soviet Union invaded Finland on November 30, 1939. There was no formal declaration of war.⁵⁸</p> <p>The Finns successfully used the subarctic conditions and hit and run tactics to exact a heavy toll on invading Soviet forces, placing the larger but luckless Russian force on the defensive. The Finns were able to continue resistance to the Soviet force</p>	<p>“Enforcing neutrality had preserved Finnish independence. Although Finland had suffered 24,932 dead and 43,557 wounded out of a population of 3.5 million, Russian losses consisted of 1,000 planes, 2,300 armoured units, and over a million dead.⁶⁰ The losses suffered by Russian forces demonstrated that a small neutral could inflict a high price for invasion of its territory, and neutrality became the defining factor of the Soviet-Finnish relationship.</p> <p>There does exist an ambiguous legal basis for neutrality in the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed with the Soviet Union in 1948. It obligates Finland to prevent its territory from being used as a tool of invasion, but any legal declaration of neutrality would require such a measure.⁶¹ Finnish neutrality policy was invariably defined by the experiences arising from</p>

<p>until March 8, when a Finnish delegation traveled to Moscow to sue for peace. Finland accepted harsh Russian terms that deprived it of 22,000 miles of its territory but preserved its independence. This demonstrated the value of a well-armed neutrality to Finland, especially after the fall of Poland and Latvia.⁵⁹ (58) Packard, <i>Neither Friend Nor Foe</i> pp. 96-97. 59 Ibid. p. 99. 60 Ibid.</p>	<p>relations with Russia. Having been an independent country since 1918 left few other opportunities to develop a foreign policy stance. The removal of that threat has enabled Finland to relax the conditions of its neutrality policy somewhat. Given the existence of a bordering state with an uncertain political climate, Finland has taken a more cautious stance than Ireland in the preservation of its neutrality.” (60) Packard, <i>Neither Friend Nor Foe</i> p 99</p>
<p>The Republic of Ireland</p>	
<p>“Irish tradition of neutrality first came into use during the Second World War. Ireland began its history as a modern independent state with only one foreign policy goal. That goal was to extricate the island of Ireland from British rule. As the Republic of Ireland has grown into its independence, it sought to involve itself in the world around it. The European Union has proven to be a great economic benefit to Ireland. Ireland has changed from a relatively isolated state dependent on British trade into a globally focused country with diverse trade relationships.”⁸</p> <p>The Irish have chosen to interpret their neutrality flexibly. That flexibility enabled Ireland to enter the EEC in 1973. The European Union...provides the tools to give Ireland greater influence.” ... “Having a voice in the development of EU policy enhances Ireland’s international profile. Even with the benefits that came with EU membership, the attachment to neutrality remains strong.”⁹</p> <p>“The introduction of the concept of a common defence policy in the Maastricht Treaty presented the greatest difficulty to Ireland. It has been manageable due to the primarily intergovernmental nature of CFSP. Ireland further sought to define its role within the CFSP by reaffirming the Irish policy of military neutrality and pledging to hold a referendum on any European Union decision on common defence. As argued by Taoiseach Bertie Ahern, The main emphasis in defence policy, not just in Ireland, but in Europe today has moved onto international peacekeeping and conflict resolution.”⁹¹</p> <p>“It is the potential for peacekeeping that is now important to Ireland. Ireland has changed since its separation from Britain. The</p>	<p><i>Communities, 1999</i>). http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/eu_cons_treaty_en.pdf Article 16. (91) <i>Tithe an Oireachtais/Houses of the Oireachtas, Dail Debates 27 January, 1999.</i></p> <p>“While similar to the neutrality practices of other European nations, Irish neutrality has been strongly influenced by historical and geopolitical circumstances. This has resulted in a uniquely Irish approach to neutrality... much closer to the Finnish-Swedish model (which emphasize neutrality as a foreign policy position) than the Austro-Swiss model” (which make binding constitutional commitments to neutrality).</p> <p>“Although military power is a secondary component of neutrality, Ireland has been accused of failing to exploit it in order to safeguard its neutrality. Ireland has been described as a “virtually unarmed” nation.²⁰ It is not disputed that Ireland would give a determined aggressor pause, but the World War Two experience of Ireland demonstrated that a large military force was not necessary. The British Navy stood as a buffer between Ireland and Germany. In addition, it is not in dispute that Ireland would have fought an invading force, no matter how ineffective that effort might be.”¹²</p> <p>“By the time Ireland was consulted on joining the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, it had made any such move contingent on being able to do so as a united Ireland. While this weakened the more rational argument that neutrality was the natural mode for Ireland based on its geographical and historical circumstances, it was pursued as a viable means of achieving the goal of reunification. This development of Irish neutrality sets it apart from other European neutrals.”</p> <p>“Discussion of possible conflicts between neutrality and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is kept to a minimum. Ireland has displayed a tendency towards emphasising one and downplaying the other, depending on which one is important to the matter at hand. Ireland has not been asked to choose between the two, so criticism for attempting to have it both ways has been avoided. The lines between what constitutes</p>

<p>range of Irish foreign policy has grown. Yet neutrality has remained flexible, stretching to accommodate the growing demands of Irish foreign policy.”¹⁰ ... “Irish society has embraced the concept of “military neutrality” which is meant to emphasise the Irish insistence in avoiding alliance commitments. Still it allows them to engage themselves internationally via the UN (Ireland is currently serving on the UN security council), and pursue an active peacekeeping and humanitarian aid policy. This stems from the historical circumstances under which Irish neutrality developed.”¹¹</p> <p><i>(90) Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, The Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts. (Luxembourg: Office for Official publications of the European</i></p>	<p>neutrality policy and what is acceptable under the CFSP are blurred, as Ireland intends. This provides more manoeuvring room for Irish foreign policy.”¹³</p> <p>“Ireland thus remains an active participant in CFSP. Neutrality is compatible with the CFSP, and co-exists alongside it. Rejection of the Treaty of Nice by a slim margin in a recent referendum does not imply that Irish opinion towards the EU has changed. The history of Irish involvement within the EC has indicated a strong commitment towards the European Union. The benefits of EU membership to Ireland ensure that it will continue to adapt its neutrality to accommodate developments in the CFSP.”¹⁴</p> <p><i>(20) Karsh, Neutrality and Small States. p. 166.</i></p>
<p>SWEDEN</p>	
<p>“Swedish neutrality is not enshrined in any legal or formal context. It remains simply as a principle of foreign policy that can be changed as necessary. It is a policy established by unilateral declaration. It is neither guaranteed by other states nor constitutionally prescribed. Sweden however, has a strong tradition of neutrality. This strength is demonstrated through its effective use in World War Two.”¹⁵</p> <p>“In 1939, Sweden maintained a profound expression of neutrality as the first line of defence. The importance of massive iron ore exports to Britain and Germany however, as well as relatively close geographical proximity to Germany, presented the possibility that Swedish neutrality would not be respected in Berlin. The objective then became to exact as high a price as possible for the invasion of Sweden, in essence making such invasion prohibitive for the belligerent forces. Spending on defence during this period reflects the serious commitment to neutrality. Defence expenditures increased nearly twofold in 1939 to \$60 million.⁵⁶ Fifteen submarines and a fleet of warships defended the 1,400 mile Swedish coastline. A highly trained force of 200 aircraft and a large proportion of the civilian population were enlisted to harass any invasion that breached the first line of defence.”¹⁶</p> <p>Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs, Wednesday 14 February 2007¹⁷: “The importance</p>	<p>“While these measures were not expected to successfully repel an invasion, they were intended to communicate to any belligerent that Sweden would fight a war of attrition to maintain its neutral status. This commitment to a well-armed neutrality provided credibility to Swedish neutrality policy while at the same time providing the benefit of a deterrent.”¹⁹</p> <p>“Swedish neutrality did come into question as a state policy however in the aftermath of the Second World War. As the victors split into their respective spheres of influence, Sweden proposed the development of a Scandinavian defence alliance to Norway and Denmark in which the three would follow a policy of neutrality, but with a mutual defence commitment.⁵⁷ Norway and Denmark declined however, opting instead for inclusion in NATO. The concept of an alliance of neutrals is a rather odd one, as coming to the aid of another country would violate strict neutrality – even if that other country were a fellow neutral. What this example best demonstrates however is that Sweden was willing to alter its neutrality policy drastically in order to achieve what it perceived as the most desirable result. Neutrality was subject to flexibility in its interpretation.”</p> <p>“The end of the cold war and the example of Ireland as a neutral within the EEC eased Swedish concerns about reconciling neutrality policy with full participation in the EC. As a result Sweden, Austria and Finland joined the EC in 1995. Sweden, much like Ireland in 1973, was confident that its interpretation of neutrality was sufficient to allow for membership in the European Union.”</p>

<p>of promoting democracy, human rights and sustainable development runs through Swedish foreign policy. The development and formulation of our foreign and security policy must continue to be based on broad national consensus. Sweden is not part of any military alliance. The future security of our country is based on community and cooperation with other countries. These cornerstones of Sweden’s relations with other countries endure, even though since the beginning of the 1990s we have entered a fundamentally new phase in foreign and security policy and a decisive new phase in further global development. Through membership of the political alliance that the European Union constitutes, Sweden has broken away from a tradition dating back to 1812.”¹⁸</p>	<p>Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs, Wednesday 14 February 2007 ²⁰: “For almost two centuries after (1812, Sweden’s) policy was ultimately about trying to prevent our country from being drawn into the general European war that was always a looming threat. During the latter part of the last century, it was this endeavour that led to the policy often called a policy of neutrality. This was a policy that in all essentials served us well – a point we must not disregard when we now discuss more openly the manner in which it was conducted or presented. However, the fall of the Soviet dictatorship and its empire, combined with increasingly intense European integration, created a fundamentally new situation. It was natural for Sweden to join the European Union and, by participating in the Union’s efforts to gradually strengthen cooperation and integration between the democracies of Europe, help build a new order of peace in our part of the world.”²¹</p> <p><i>(56) Packard, Jerrold M. Neither Friend Nor Foe: The European Neutrals in World War Two. (New York: Crarle’s Scribner’s Sons, 1992.) pp. 90-91.(57) Neuhold, The European Neutrals in International Affairs. p. 43. 30 common market.</i>²²</p>
<p>SWITZERLAND</p> <p>“Swiss neutrality has continued unbroken since the 1815 treaty of Paris, giving it a sense of permanence that has led it to be considered a “traditional neutral.” Sweden shares this distinction having maintained its neutral status with some difficulty since the nineteenth century.⁴⁶ Switzerland provides the oldest example of neutrality policy in practice. Its neutrality has been described by the term neutralization”²³.</p> <p>“Switzerland has had time to evolve and more closely define its obligations. Since 1848, Swiss neutrality has been inscribed in the Swiss Federal Constitution, but it has done so with the flexibility of Swiss interests in mind. Article 173 of the Swiss Federal Constitution assigns the Federal Parliament the task of taking “measures to safeguard the external security, the independence and the neutrality of Switzerland.”⁴⁷ Although this rather vague reference enshrines the concept of neutrality in the constitution of Switzerland, it does so as only a means to an end. This ensures that neutrality remains a maxim of state instead of a legally restrictive doctrine, and prepares for the unlikely possibility of having to abandon that status, if only in theory. This distinction remains important in the development of policy, because it ensures that “in time of peace, the perpetually neutral state exercises freedom of</p>	<p>Rather than attempting to pursue the path of reconciling neutrality policy with deeper economic and political ties within Europe, Switzerland has attempted to make the best possible use of the flexible character of neutrality. For Switzerland, neutrality is no longer just about remaining uninvolved in the wars of other nations. Rather, it is seen by Switzerland as an obligation that must be fulfilled if the permanent neutral is to be recognized and respected. The use of “good offices” is utilized to this end. In terms of international law, good offices refer to the action of a third state, an international organization or an individual in order to resolve a dispute between conflicting countries. In Switzerland this concept has been extended to include a variety of activities that aim at bridging the gap in international controversies, using means such as mediation and arbitration in the hope of pacific settlement of disputes.⁴⁹</p> <p>Swiss neutrality is not treated as a passive endeavour. The defence strategy established for Switzerland dictates an active foreign policy. It intends to defuse causes of conflict, contribute to their solutions, and act in a manner that ensures respect for international law and works for the maintenance of peace. This does not imply a lack of military preparedness. Switzerland employs a policy of well-armed neutrality, given the close proximity of major powers. Members of the Swiss army are primarily militia, which can be mobilized to a strength of 625,000 troops in less than forty-eight hours.⁵⁰ In addition, highly defensible terrain and pre-emptive mining of over 2,000 mines, tunnels and bridges has provided an additional advantage. Any belligerent attempting to violate Swiss territory would find it a difficult task. It is this mix of military defence and active foreign policy that forms the most opportune implementation of Swiss neutrality.</p>

judgement over its policy.”⁴⁸

“While not legally binding as a policy stance, it exists as one of the major components in the identity of the country. This aspect of identity makes it extremely difficult for politicians to disregard neutrality policy in Switzerland.”²⁴

(46) Sharp, *Irish Foreign Policy*. (47) Government of Switzerland. *The Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation*. April 18, 1999 <http://www.swissemb.org/legal/html/constitution.html>. 48 Milivojević, Marko, Pierre Maurer. *Swiss Neutrality and Security: Armed Forces, National Defence and Foreign Policy*. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990). pp. 181-182.

This model of military defence provides a stark contrast to the Irish model. The preservation of neutrality has required more of Switzerland.

(49) Neuhold, Hanspeter, Hans Thalburg Eds. *The European Neutrals in International Affairs*. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984). p. 7.

Endnotes: Annex 5

¹ Lake, Brian William “Neutrality and the Common Foreign and Security Policy: an Analysis”, for Bachelor of Arts (Honours) degree, Department of Political Science, Memorial University of Newfoundland, September, 2001 www.ucs.mun.ca/~brian/academic/Irish_neutrality_pdf

² Lake, Brian William “Neutrality and the Common Foreign and Security Policy: an Analysis”, for Bachelor of Arts (Honours) degree, Department of Political Science, Memorial University of Newfoundland, September, 2001 www.ucs.mun.ca/~brian/academic/Irish_neutrality_pdf

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¹² Lake, Brian William “Neutrality and the Common Foreign and Security Policy: an Analysis”, for Bachelor of Arts (Honours) degree, Department of Political Science, Memorial University of Newfoundland, September, 2001, www.uccs.mun.ca/~brian/academic/Irish_neutrality.doc

¹³ Lake, Brian William “Neutrality and the Common Foreign and Security Policy: an Analysis”, for Bachelor of Arts (Honours) degree, Department of Political Science, Memorial University of Newfoundland, September, 2001, www.uccs.mun.ca/~brian/academic/Irish_neutrality.doc

¹⁴ “In the 2001 referendum on Nice, the vote was Yes - 46.13%, No - 53.87%, with a turnout of 34.79% of the electorate. See <http://www.referendum.ie/home/>”, quoted in: Lake, Brian William “Neutrality and the Common Foreign and Security Policy: an Analysis”, for Bachelor of Arts (Honours) degree, Department of Political Science, Memorial University of Newfoundland, September, 2001, www.uccs.mun.ca/~brian/academic/Irish_neutrality.doc

¹⁵ Lake, Brian William “Neutrality and the Common Foreign and Security Policy: an Analysis”, for Bachelor of Arts (Honours) degree, Department of Political Science, Memorial University of Newfoundland, September, 2001, www.uccs.mun.ca/~brian/academic/Irish_neutrality.doc

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¹⁷ Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs,” Wednesday 14 February 2007 www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/03/96/05/23e521a9.pdf

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²³ See definition in box two on page one of this Annex

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